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Many economists and social theorists hypothesize 
that most societies could soon face a ‘post-work’ 
future, one in which employment and productive 
labor have a dramatically reduced place in human 
affairs. Given the centrality of employment to 
individual identity and its pivotal role as the 
primary provider of economic and other goods, 
transitioning to a ‘post-work’ future could prove 
traumatic and disorienting to many. Policymakers 
are thus likely to face the difficult choice of the 
extent to which they ought to satisfy individual 
citizens’ desires to work in a socioeconomic 
environment in which work is in permanent 
decline. Here I argue that policymakers confronting 
a post-work economy should discount, or at least 
consider problematic, the desire to work because 
it is very likely that this desire is an adaptive 
preference. An adaptive preference is a preference 
for some state of affairs within a limited set of 
options formed under unjust conditions.  
The widespread desire for work has been formed 
under unjust labor conditions to which individuals 
are compelled to submit in order to meet material 
and ethical needs. Furthermore, the prevalence 
of the ‘work dogma’ in contemporary societies 
precludes nearly all individuals from seeing 
alternatives to work as live options. 
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Many economists and social commentators 
predict that coming decades will mark a 
decline in work — or at least in jobs — as 
we have come to know them. Automation 
and the increased use of robotics; stagnating 
economic growth in advanced economies; 
an aging population; declines in employer 
and employee loyalty; continued reductions 
in the power of labour unions; continued 
growth in contingent or piecework and 
the gig economy; and the emergence of a 
‘millennial’ generation that values flexibility, 
engagement, and personal development; 
all of these trends form the conditions for 
an economy and culture in which fewer 
individuals work, where fewer of those 
who do work have traditional jobs, and 
where work in general has a less prominent 
role in organizing personal and social life. 
Disagreement exists about the magnitude 
of these developments taken individually, 
as well as about the exact extent to which 
work or jobs will decline in the future. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus 
that we are headed toward a world that, in 
comparison with recent decades at least, 
will be ‘post-work’ — or at least ‘post-jobs’. 
(Frey and Osborne 2014, Brynjolfsson and 
McAfree 2014, Thompson 2014, Srnicek and 
Williams 2015, Stern 2016) 
The prospect of a post-work or post-jobs 
future raises many critical questions 
for policymakers and political leaders, 
including: shall societies subsidize or 
guarantee work? Shall societies reduce the 
workweek or take other steps to distribute 
work opportunities more broadly? Shall 
income be made less dependent on work, 
such as via the provision of an unconditional 
basic income? In the background of each 
of these policy questions, however, is an 
arguably more fundamental philosophical 
question regarding work and workers: to 
what extent should these policy decisions 
reflect individual citizens’ desire to work? 
The desire to work is after all widespread 
and well entrenched. Lottery winners and 
retirees often continue to work despite 
having virtually no need for the income 
work typically provides (Arvey, Harpaz, 
& Liao 1996).  Few developments appear 
worse for individual physical well-being, 
mental health, and sense of self-worth 
than continual unemployment.1 Work is a 
potent source of meaning (Veltman 2016) 
and identity for many people (Fryers 2006), 
as work is a primary arena through which 
individuals develop and manifest their skills 
and character. And while job satisfaction 
predictably dipped during and immediately 
after the Great Recession (HITC.com 2013), 
many people report being at least somewhat 
satisfied with their jobs (Pew Research 
Center 2016b, Society for Human Resource 
Management, 2017).
 
Ordinarily, policymakers can and do 
take individuals’ desires into account in 
their decision making. By giving people 
what they desire, we are likely to make 
them happier, advance their interests, or 
improve their quality of life. Honouring 
their desires is also a way of respecting 
their individual autonomy or recognizing 
them as holders of certain rights. Thus, for 
policymakers across the political spectrum, 
one of the state’s central aims is to enable 
people’s desires to be realized. But if the 
aforementioned predictions concerning 
 1 On unemployment’s adverse effects on overall health, 
see Brenner 2005, Herbig, Dragano, & Angerer 2013, 
Margerison-Zilko et al. 2015. For the adverse effect of 
unemployment on mental health and self-worth, see 
Karsten & Moser 2009, Rutgers University Heldrich 
Center for Workplace Development 2009, Goldsmith 
and Diette 2012, Pharr, Moonie, & Bungum 2012, and 
Calvo, Mair, & Sarkisian 2015.
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the emergence of a post-work economy 
are correct, policymakers will increasingly 
struggle to satisfy citizens’ desire to work. 
Full employment, so long a cornerstone of 
modern economic policy, will come to be 
seen as a Sisyphean pursuit. Indeed, the 
confluence of the socioeconomic trends 
mentioned above will make it harder for 
governments to craft policies that place 
work (or at least desirable or worthwhile 
work) within citizens’ reach.
 
The question I shall therefore investigate is 
whether or not the desire to work is one that 
the state should help its members realize, 
especially given (if the aforementioned 
prognostications are correct) that 
individuals will find it harder to realize this 
goal, and, on a wide scale, states will find it 
harder to facilitate it. 
 
Since the 1980s, many scholars have argued 
that there is a particular class of desires 2 
that policymakers should not take at face 
value when they consider how to craft a 
just society, i.e., a class of  desires that can 
rightfully be discounted, or even ignored, 
in policymaking. Feminist philosophers, 
for example, have observed that there is 
something amiss about taking desires that 
women sometimes form when acculturated 
within sexist or misogynist societies as 
the basis for subsequent policy choices. 
Imagine women in a sexist society who 
(for example) are denied access to higher 
education. It would not be surprising to 
learn that many women in such a society in 
fact have little desire for higher education, 
so that its being denied them would not feel, 
under these conditions, like a deprivation. 
There might, hypothetically, be a resulting 
indifference to whether their societies 
provide women access to higher education. 
But to craft education policy based on 
such indifference seems suspect: a desire 
for an arguably unjust state of affairs — 
unequal educational access for men and 
women — that individuals have in no small 
measure because they have been socialized 
under unjust conditions that encourage 
or ratify this desire seems tainted. Such a 
desire appears epistemically corrupted, 
inasmuch as it does not seem to reflect 
what individuals ‘really’ want. As Ann Cudd 
(2006, p. 181) elaborates, “the oppressed 
come to desire that which is oppressive to 
them…[and] one’s desires turn away from 
goods and even needs that, absent those 
conditions, they would want.” We may 
suspect that women in a sexist society of the 
sort just described lack the desire for access 
to higher education not for any reason 
(or any good reason) related to higher 
education or the goods or opportunities it 
provides. Rather, their desire stems from 
ignorance of, or an insufficient appreciation 
of, those goods or opportunities. From 
the policymaker’s perspective, such 
desires appear uninformed, and a 
policymaker would therefore be reluctant 
to unproblematically treat the realization of 
such desires as a policy objective. 
 
Philosophers have come to call desires 
of this sort — at a first approximation, 
desires concerning some option where 
the individual’s preference concerning 
that option is psychologically traceable 
to its having been acquired under unjust 
conditions — adaptive preferences. 
Adaptive preferences are an active area 
of research in philosophical ethics, and 
while I will here lay out what strikes me as 
a credible account of adaptive preferences 
and why they should not be accorded the 
same respect in policymaking as other 
desires are, this is intended only as a sketch, 
 2 “A particular class” since it is likely that there are other 
classes of desires (desires rooted in addiction, say, or 
sadistic desires) that also should not be given their full 
due in policymaking.
Autonomy: 04 : July 2018 4Autonomy
rather than a comprehensive philosophical 
treatment, of how we might vindicate the 
intuition that adaptive preferences should 
not enjoy the same role in policy making 
as other preferences. Not everyone shares 
this intuition or believes that the fact that 
preferences can be adaptive provides a 
compelling explanation on its own for why 
they ought to be treated with suspicion in 
policymaking. (Baber 2007, Bruckner 2009, 
Dorsey unpublished) I do not aim to answer 
fully the worries of such skeptics here, but I 
hope that my discussion will introduce new 
considerations into the debate and give such 
skeptics food for thought.
  
My larger objective is to argue that the 
widespread desire to work should itself 
be classified as an adaptive preference, 
and as such, policymakers confronting a 
post-work future should not assign this 
desire as much weight as they would 
assign to individuals’ standard or non-
adaptive preferences. The desire to work 
ought be seen as the by-product of unjust 
social conditions that both enable and are 
propped up by what David Frayne (2015) 
has called the “work dogma.” In advancing 
this thesis, I engage with an epistemic issue 
that has, so far as I am aware, been largely 
neglected in prior discussions of adaptive 
preferences: Individuals often live under 
unjust conditions and so form desires 
under those conditions. But how are we to 
distinguish desires merely formed under 
those conditions, which presumably should 
merit the ordinary amount of respect in 
subsequent policymaking, from desires 
shaped by the injustice present in such 
conditions, which presumably should not 
merit the ordinary amount of respect? An 
examination of extant literature on adaptive 
preferences hints that what troubles many 
scholars is the fact that individuals come 
to have these preferences because of prior 
unjust conditions. Here I propose that 
adaptive preferences have two features, 
which I will call unthinkability and 
underdetermination, that distinguish them 
from more benign preferences formed under 
unjust conditions. And because the desire 
to work, having been formed under unjust 
conditions, also has these two features, it 
ought not be accorded the same weight as 
other preferences would receive in policy 
making. I conclude with some brief remarks 
concerning what policies are best pursued 
in relation to the prospect of a post-work 
economy given that the desire to work is an 
adaptive preference.
1. Adaptive preferences and unthinkable 
options 
 
Examples of adaptive preferences 
have been more abundant than precise 
characterizations of such preferences or of 
what renders them suspect. Remaining in 
abusive marriages believing that such abuse 
is part of women’s lot (Nussbaum 2001a, p. 
112); a willingness to tolerate a lack of clean 
water supplies (Nussbaum 2001a, p. 113); 
accepting wages below what members of 
another gender receive for the same forms 
of labor (Nussbaum 2001a, p. 113); rejecting 
diagnoses of illness and thereby foregoing 
needed medical care (Sen 1999a, p. 53); and 
not opposing tyrannical governments (Sen 
2002, p. 634); all have been put forth as 
instances of adaptive preferences. Theorists 
disagree about the psychological histories 
of adaptive preferences, i.e., whether 
they must be formed non-autonomously, 
unconsciously, via habituation or 
internalization, on the basis of deficient 
rational reflection, etc.3 They agree, however, 
that adaptive preferences are shaped by 
facts about what options agents have 
(or believe they have). As Rosa Terlazzo 
(2015, p. 179) explains, “the idea behind the 
3 See, among many discussions, Elster 1983, Nussbuam 
2001b, Friedman 2003, Khader 2009, Taylor 2009, and 
Colburn 2011. 
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concept of adaptive preferences is roughly 
this: that when persons have limited option 
sets, they can come to prefer things within 
those sets that they would not prefer 
otherwise” (See also Elster 1983, p. 229; 
Rickard 1995, Bruckner 2009, p. 307, Dorsey 
forthcoming, pp. 3-4.).
 
Yet this characterization does not capture 
what renders adaptive preferences 
troubling. For the fact that a preference is 
shaped by one’s options, or the perceptions 
thereof, does not render a preference 
problematic. Quite the contrary: Our 
preferences should adapt to our available 
options. Upon learning that one’s favourite 
coffee shop has closed, the yearning to dine 
there might linger, but the rational response 
is to relinquish that preference. The fact that 
such a preference has been “formed through 
adjustment to reality” hardly impugns 
its credentials (Nussbaum 2001c, p. 78). 
Furthermore, that a preference was formed 
in response to “deprivation” or “adverse 
situations” does not by itself suggest it 
should be looked upon sceptically (Sen 
1999a, pp. 62-63). 
 
Thus, the fact that adaptive preferences 
are adaptive in the narrow sense of being 
preferences shaped by choosers’ options 
does not provide a basis for concluding that 
such preferences are morally or politically 
problematic such that they are not entitled 
to the same respect or weight in our 
deliberations about what to do or how to 
fashion our institutions or policies. What 
further features must adaptive preferences 
possess, then, in order to render them 
problematic? Why, as in our earlier example, 
should policymakers work to provide access 
to higher education to women despite 
women having no apparent desire for it?
 
We can home in on these further features 
by considering the work of Jon Elster, 
the philosopher most responsible for 
introducing the concept of adaptive 
preferences. Elster (1983, p. 123) used the 
well- known fable of the Fox and the Grapes 
to articulate the concept, so returning to 
that fable can help illuminate what makes 
adaptive preferences worryingly ‘adaptive’. 
There are many versions of the fable. My 
own favourite takes the form of a limerick by 
W.J. Linton:
 This Fox has a longing for grapes:
 He jumps, but the bunch still escapes.
 So he goes away sour;
 And, ’tis said, to this hour
 Declares that he’s no taste for grapes.
 (Crane 1887)
We are not told whether the grapes in 
question were in fact sweet and ripe, but 
they were at least tempting enough to attract 
the fox. Yet upon finding himself unable to 
leap high enough to reach the grapes, the fox 
departs, having apparently relinquished his 
desire for the grapes. 
 
As we just noted, there seems nothing 
obviously troubling, irrational, etc., about 
this shift in the Fox’s preferences. The Fox’s 
set of options, he learns, is narrower than he 
thought. And his desires (and ours) ought 
to adapt to our available options. Indeed, we 
may conclude that in the Fox’s case, his not 
being able to reach the grapes is not itself 
an irrational basis for him to relinquish his 
desire for them. In terms made familiar by 
economists, the Fox’s expected utility from 
pursuing the grapes is in fact zero. Since 
the apparent probability of his attaining 
the grapes is zero, his expected utility (the 
product of that probability multiplied by 
the strength of his desire for the grapes) is 
also zero. Rather than being an irrational 
response, the Fox’s response is exactly how 
a rational chooser should respond to an 
option being foreclosed to her. Thus, the 
fact that an adaptive preference represents a 
response to one’s options being constrained 
is at most a necessary condition of its being 
adaptive. But it does not shed much light on 
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why it should be discounted or ignored by 
policymakers.   
 
Recall, however, that upon discovering 
that the grapes are just out of reach, the 
Fox not only walks away, he re-evaluates 
the desirability of the grapes. What seems 
troubling about his change in preferences 
is that the Fox rationalizes his revised 
preferences not by reference to the 
impossibility of attaining the grapes but by 
recalibrating his appraisal of the grapes. The 
fox does not sour on the grapes because the 
grapes soured. Rather, he seems to project 
his frustration with his inability to reach the 
grapes onto the grapes themselves. He thus 
reaches a correct practical conclusion (‘I 
shall not continue to pursue these grapes’) 
via an unsound deliberative route (Watts 
2009).
 
Such projection probably does not occur in 
most cases of actual adaptive preferences. 
Women in sexist societies probably do not 
discover that higher education is off limits 
to them and then become averse to pursuing 
higher education, for example. Rather, those 
who hold adaptive preferences are, through 
the forces of socialization etc. exerted under 
unjust conditions, disposed to some options 
as unthinkable. To prefer some option A 
within some relevant set containing A, B, C, 
etc. because B, C, etc. are unthinkable is not 
to literally perceive B, C, etc., as conceptually 
impossible. Indeed, those with an adaptive 
preference for A are probably fully aware 
that others, either within their community 
or outside it, prefer B, C, etc. to A. But for 
those with an adaptive preference for A, 
alternatives are at least ‘not for them.’4 
Adaptive preferences are therefore likely to 
have a strongly indexical or agent-relative 
character.
 
That a chooser might come to find an 
option intrinsically undesirable in part 
because she cannot realize that option may 
seem strange. But I take this to rest on the 
all too common human tendency toward 
optimistic self-appraisal, and in particular, 
the psychological need to maintain a sense 
of one’s agency as the locus of control over 
significant outcomes.5  That an option is 
unattainable may be understood (or in 
many cases, misunderstood) as the result 
of one’s own inability to attain it. Yet if the 
option ‘turns out’ to have been undesirable 
all along, then its unattainability represents 
no threat to the agent’s self-image. Better, 
or at least more emotionally tractable, to 
disdain the option. Hugh Breakey provides 
a vivid description of how such a process 
might unfold:
 
As the Fox’s change of mind illustrates, 
unthinkability seems to capture part of why 
adaptive preferences should be treated as 
suspect: Their apparent rationality conceals 
the fact that one premise responsible 
for their formation is false, or at least 
unjustified. The Fox does not know the 
grapes are sour. Indeed, he has no particular 
evidence for that claim at all.  
4 This is not to preclude the possibility of options varying 
in their degrees of unthinkability.
5For the introduction of the concept of locus of control, see 
Rotter (1966).
What is at work here, I think, is a 
colouring of mood and habituation  
of thought. Emotionally, we work  
up a state of dislike, hatred, disgust,  
resentment or scorn (perhaps fuelled  
by our incapacity to attain the object)  
and we direct it at the unattainable  
object itself. We smear it internally  
with ugly emotive connotations.  
Cognitively, we develop a habit of 
stressing its defects to ourselves 
whenever we consider it. In this way, 
we mentally paper over the genuine 
desire that remains for the object. 
(2010, p. 32)
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Similarly, in the case of actual adaptive 
preferences, their holders do not seem to 
have a good reason for them, even if their 
inability to attain the objects of those 
preferences might otherwise be a good 
reason to hold such preferences. The 
preferences in question turn pivotally on 
normative or evaluative judgments for 
which they lack sufficient evidence. And if 
only those preferences that meet minimal 
standards for rationality merit full respect by 
policymakers, then adaptive preferences do 
not merit such respect. 
 
In addition, it is morally significant that 
those with adaptive preferences have false 
beliefs regarding the normative premises 
incorporated into their practical reasoning. 
Those with adaptive preferences engage, 
like all agents, in practical reasoning. And 
though their reasoning (again) may land on 
the correct conclusion in the circumstances 
(that the unattainability of B, C, etc., justifies 
a preference for A), they land on those 
conclusions on the basis of unjustified 
normative premises. And it does seem to 
be more objectionable or lamentable for 
individuals to engage in practical reasoning 
that rests on unjustified normative premises 
— the premises concerning their goals, 
ends, or values — than it does for them to 
engage in practical reasoning on unjustified 
non-normative or empirical premises. The 
normative attitudes that constitute what Rawls 
called our conception of the good form the 
agenda for our practical pursuits, and so, in 
this respect, have a kind of normative priority 
over the non-normative attitudes on which 
we rely in order to pursue our conceptions of 
the good. As I argue elsewhere (Cholbi, 2017), 
we have stronger reason to object to treatment 
that interferes with our capacity to rationally 
will ends than we have to object to treatment 
that interferes with our capacity to identify 
the best means to those ends (or to determine 
whether there are any means sufficient to 
our willed ends). Interference of this first sort 
engages with those capacities with which we 
more closely identify as practical agents and 
so reflects greater mistrust of us as practical 
agents. In the case of adaptive preferences, 
those holding them have had their attitudes 
manipulated so that though they reach 
justifiable practical conclusions about what 
they ought to do under the circumstances, they 
do not appreciate how they have mistaken 
the unattainable for the unthinkable. In terms 
akin to those popularized by Rawls, those with 
adaptive preferences have come to think that 
the pursuit of certain options is unreasonable, 
when in reality the unjust conditions under 
which they live have made the pursuit of 
certain reasonable options irrational. 
 
We have established therefore that adaptive 
preferences are preferences formed under 
conditions of injustice wherein an individual 
prefers some option over some set of 
relevant alternatives, where alternatives 
to the preferred option come to be viewed 
as unthinkable. That adaptive preferences 
are unthinkable in this way is a claim that 
several have gestured at. Amartya Sen, for 
instance, remarks that the poor may “come 
to terms with their deprivation” by adjusting 
“their desires and expectations to what they 
unambitiously see as feasible” (Sen 1999b,  
p. 30).
 
Still, we have not yet teased out all the salient 
features of adaptive preferences. That this 
is so becomes evident when we confront an 
epistemological difficulty associated with 
the identification of adaptive preferences. 
That a preference reflects limited options, 
whether in reality or in choosers’ perceptions 
thereof; that the preference was formed 
6 This account of adaptive preferences also needs to be 
limited in one specific way: An individual living under 
unjust conditions may prefer to have those conditions 
overturned and view extant conditions as unthinkable. 
Thus, adaptive preferences probably cannot have the 
unjust circumstances themselves as their objects.
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under unjust conditions; and that the 
preference holder rules out alternatives 
to her preference as unthinkable;6 even 
when all of these hold true, we might still 
wonder whether individuals’ preferences 
satisfying these criteria have been formed 
because of those individuals living under 
unjust conditions. It is after all possible 
that individuals have the preferences they 
do for reasons unrelated to those unjust 
conditions, that is, that the injustice of 
the conditions is merely incidental to the 
preferences having been formed under those 
conditions. We thus seem to need indicators 
of preferences whose ‘adaptiveness’ is due to 
unjust background conditions. Fortunately, 
an examination of the desire to work 
highlights the evidence needed to ascertain 
that an adaptive preference is due to unjust 
conditions. But we must first address 
whether the present day desire to work has 
in fact been formed under unjust conditions.
2.  Injustice and the desire to work
That the desire to work meets one of the 
conditions for an adaptive preference 
— that it has been formed under unjust 
conditions — is no doubt contentious. All 
the same, establishing such a claim does not 
depend on endorsing any comprehensive 
theory of justice, so long as we draw upon 
considerations that nearly any such theory 
would recognize as speaking in favour of 
the injustice of the present-day conditions 
in which the widespread desire to work has 
been formed.
 
The considerations relevant to the desire to 
work are the conditions of contemporary 
work and of the workplace itself. The first 
class of such considerations are broadly 
material. One general way in which 
these conditions can be unjust is if work 
(understood primarily as paid employment) 
does not offer workers a fair balance of 
effort and reward. Certainly workers receive 
some goods through their work – wages, at 
a minimum. But the rewards for their work 
are often more meagre than justice would 
mandate. Thanks to stagnating wages, 
recent decades have seen an explosion in 
‘working poor,’ individuals whose work does 
not offer adequate monetary compensation 
to remove them from poverty. In the U.S., 40 
percent of those in poverty work full time 
(Dalaker, 2017), and three-fifths of those in 
poverty in the UK live in households where 
someone is employed (Butler, 2017). That a 
large number of the working poor receive 
public assistance only highlights how 
working often fails to provide a fair reward 
for workers’ efforts.
 
Simultaneously, we often underestimate 
the burdens associated with working. The 
most obvious burden is the opportunity 
cost associated with time spent working. 
Workers in most countries spend around 
2,000 hours per year on the job, the 
equivalent of working ‘24/7’ for 11 weeks. 
These statistics do not include the time 
spent travelling to and from work sites. 
In the U.S., an average commute requires 
180 hours per year (Ingraham 2016). The 
time associated with working is time not 
spent on leisure, social relationships, or 
community activities. And what time 
workers retain for themselves is increasingly 
devalued by the expectation that they will 
remain electronically “connected” to the 
workplace through e-mail, text messaging, 
etc. (Gregg 2011). This expectation results in 
the fragmentation of workers’ ‘free’ time and 
makes wholehearted engagement with non-
work activities more elusive.
 
Another neglected burden associated 
with work is that it costs money to work. 
Consider commuting again. In addition 
to being a source of stress and ill health 
(Ingraham 2016), commuting can be 
costly; Vasel (2015) notes how it costs, 
on average, $2,600 per worker in the US. 
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Workers can also bear monetary costs for 
clothing or equipment required or expected 
in the workplace, as well as costs to pay 
other people to do work that one might be 
able to perform oneself (child care, home 
repair, house cleaning, etc.) were one not 
working. 
 
Work, then, is not all that it is cracked up to 
be: often less remunerative than is needed 
to provide for individuals’ basic needs and 
encumbered with costs we too often ignore. 
These observations make recent research 
finding that unemployment is sometimes no 
worse, or even better, than holding certain 
jobs far less surprising (Kim and von dem 
Knesebeck 2015, Chandola and Zhang 2018).
 
A second category of considerations, 
indicating that workers today operate in 
an unjust labor environment, are what we 
might call moral considerations. Here it is 
worth noting that most workplaces today 
insist that workers submit to infringements 
of their liberties in order to obtain, retain, or 
maximize the value of paid employment. To 
require background checks and drug testing, 
to utilize visual and electronic surveillance,7 
to ask employees to forego legal rights and 
agree to employer-instigated arbitration 
(Colvin 2017), to mandate dress codes, 
to police suitable subjects of workplace 
conversation (or the language in which 
those conversations are conducted), or to 
penalize workers for their political activities; 
these Foucaultian maneuvers represent 
employers infringing on employees’ 
freedom as a condition of their working. 
Elizabeth Anderson has recently likened the 
American workplace order to a communist 
dictatorship, with unaccountable superiors 
(management and ownership) enjoy largely 
arbitrary authority to govern employees by 
nearly unchecked fiat. As Anderson (2017, 
p. 37ff.) observes, workers thereby appear 
to tolerate their employers functioning as a 
form of ‘private government’ with powers 
that exceed the powers that most workers 
would view it as justifiable for their elected 
‘public’ government to possess.
In tandem, these material and moral 
considerations imply that the widespread 
desire to work has been formed under 
labor and workforce conditions that are 
unjust insofar as they embody an unfair 
balance of burdens and benefits for workers. 
Compounding this arguably unjust balance 
of burdens and benefits is that work is 
effectively compelled or coerced in most 
societies. To achieve a decent lifestyle, nearly 
everyone must work for a significant portion 
of their lives. The aforementioned burdens of 
work are thus tolerated despite the fact that 
a society that essentially mandates work 
places weighty constraints on what Phillippe 
van Parijs calls “real freedom.” To be really 
free, van Parijs proposes, an individual 
must not only be able to act on her choices 
without others’ interference. She must also 
possess the capacities and resources to carry 
out those choices and realize her objectives. 
(van Parijs 1995) Being compelled to work 
turns real freedom against itself: by requiring 
individuals to work in order to acquire the 
material resources needed to pursue their 
ends, a society places significant limitations 
on how individuals can effectively use their 
resources, material and otherwise, in the 
pursuit of their ends.
 
Again, I have not offered a theorization of 
justice here in support of my claim that 
the desire to work has been formed under 
unjust labour conditions. But I imagine that 
adherents of a wide range of conceptions of 
justice (libertarian, communitarian, liberal, 
socialist, etc.) will agree that a set of societal 
arrangements into which individuals are 
effectively compelled; makes extremely 
extensive demands on their time, energy, 
attention, and material resources;  
often offers them economic rewards 
7  For a useful general overview of the ethical issues raised 
by workplace surveillance, see Pitesa (2012).
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inadequate to their needs; and mandates 
that they submit to violations of their 
personal freedoms they would not likely 
tolerate in other sectors of life, is highly 
suspect from the standpoint of justice. This 
conclusion should not be exaggerated: 
workers, their employment situations, and 
the political situations in which they work 
vary, and there are many workers (the well 
compensated, the skilled, the unionized, 
etc.) whose work-life represents a fair 
balance of benefit and burden, does not 
require violations of their freedom, etc. The 
conditions under which we have come to 
desire work are therefore not uniformly or 
homogenously unjust. Nevertheless, the 
workplace and the labour market as we 
know it falls well short of nearly any credible 
ideal of just exchange.
 
3. The desire for work: Limited options, 
unthinkability, and underdetermination
  
Having shown that the desire to work has 
been formed under unjust conditions and 
that the desire to work depicts alternatives 
to work as unthinkable, let us now use the 
desire to work to identify a final condition 
on a preference being adaptive. 
 
The desire to work is clearly ‘adaptive’ 
in a minimal sense. For it is a preference 
for an option formed in contemporary 
industrialized societies wherein the primary 
alternatives to working have been foreclosed 
by a combination of policy and culture. 
 
Over the past generation or so, many 
societies have increasingly insisted that 
their members work, adopting ‘workfare’ 
policies making the receipt of various 
forms of public assistance contingent 
upon employment (or short of that, the 
conscientious pursuit thereof) (Peck 2001, 
Brodkin and Larsen 2013). And while one 
might think that the central goal of politics 
should be to expand human freedom or 
augment human happiness, the Left and 
the Right converge in supposing that the 
primary goal of economic policy is to create 
jobs. Evidently, once everyone is employed, 
freedom, happiness, and equality take care 
of themselves.
 
Culturally, work has a near sacred status 
in most prosperous nations. The remains 
of Weber’s ‘Protestant work ethic’ continue 
to exert their power over popular attitudes 
toward work, enticing individuals toward 
“the identification with and systematic 
devotion to waged work, the elevation 
of work to the centre of life, and the 
affirmation of work as an end in itself” 
(Weeks, 2011, p. 46). Work is widely seen as 
the mark of independence and the central 
responsibility associated with citizenship. 
Unsurprisingly, few events are more 
psychologically traumatic than long-term 
involuntary unemployment. Striving is 
superior to slacking, and even in the face 
of considerable evidence that hard work 
and industriousness are at best necessary 
and clearly far from sufficient for material 
success, the belief persists in work’s capacity 
to ensure such success. “Grit”, passion, 
perseverance, and self-confidence are thus 
the central virtues of what Frayne (2015) 
has coined the “work-centred society”. 
So pervasive is the belief in the necessity, 
both prudential and moral, of work that 
we increasingly struggle to describe 
activities that are arguably not work in 
terms dissociated from work. Exercising 
is ‘working out’. Troubled couples need to 
‘work on’ their relationships. Parenting is 
‘a job’ (Malesic 2017). And while educators 
may hope that education provides goods 
other than improved job opportunities, to 
argue that (say) public education should 
not make children into “job ready” adults is 
suicide in today’s political climate.
 
Of course, few fail to recognize that 
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refraining from, or refusing to work, is at 
least conceivable. But it takes considerable 
audacity to do so, since doing so labels 
the non-worker as deviant, as someone 
effectively removing themselves from the 
essential precondition of participation in 
shared public life. As Frayne (2015, pp. 2-5) 
notes, the cultural power of work is such 
that modern societies lack any serious 
debate about the merits of work and seem 
constitutively unable to imagine modes of 
social organization in which work is less 
prominent. 
 
Hence, we may reasonably conjecture that 
even if not working remains in some sense 
an abstract possibility, it is what William 
James called a “live hypothesis” for very 
few. Hence, citizens of advanced societies 
nowadays frequently find themselves 
in a position akin to the Fox’s after the 
grapes proved unattainable: They have 
adapted their preferences in light of the 
unavailability of economically and culturally 
viable alternatives to work. And as with 
other adaptive preferences, the desire 
to work does not rest on a substantive 
engagement with, or consideration of, 
alternatives. Just as the Fox, unable to attain 
the grapes, turns against them, so too have 
many members of modern societies, unable 
to attain (or even coherently envision) an 
existence without work, turned against non-
work. The desire to work is thus a desire 
forged in ignorance of relevant alternatives. 
Alternatives to work are thus unthinkable 
for most.
 
The desire to work thus satisfies the 
conditions for adaptive preferences 
adumbrated in section 1. Yet there is another 
dimension to the desire to work that 
enables us to grasp the nature of adaptive 
preferences. 
 
As noted above, an adaptive preference 
will be one its holders have because of their 
having acquired it under unjust conditions. 
We thus need indicators of when this is so. 
In the case of the desire to work, I suggest 
that we see such indicators in the apparent 
discord between the global or generic desire 
to work and the conclusions individuals 
reach regarding the specific attributes of 
work. As we shall enumerate momentarily, 
individuals view many aspects of work (or 
at least of their work) as bad or unsatisfying 
and yet retain a desire to work nonetheless. 
In my estimation, this betokens the sort 
of irrationality we would expect from an 
adaptive preference: If one judges that X 
is bad in numerous ways but nevertheless 
desires X —indeed, finds not pursuing X 
almost unfathomable — this suggests that 
one’s overall judgments have been distorted 
by socialization under unjust conditions. 
When a global judgment regarding X is 
thereby underdetermined by the particular 
judgments relevant to that global judgment, 
the judgment is likely to have been shaped 
by unjust conditions. To desire work and 
yet find nearly every aspect of the actual 
practice of work undesirable is to have a 
preference that outstrips, and is arguably 
at odds with, the evidence relevant to that 
preference. Only potent social conditioning, 
I propose, can engender this sort of discord.
 
Many people desire to work and find 
involuntarily not working to be painful or 
distressing. These attitudes are surprising, 
given how negatively individuals often 
appraise the various aspects of work 
that should presumably influence global 
appraisals of the desirability of work. A 
2008 study (Jenkins, Kopicki, Van Horn 
& Zukin) found that with respect to six 
main determinants of job quality (hours, 
education and training, health and 
medical benefits, retirement and pensions, 
retirement age, and income), fewer than half 
of American workers were “very satisfied” 
with any of these six determinants, this 
despite 51 percent reporting being satisfied 
with their jobs as a whole. A similar 
gap between global judgments of work 
satisfaction and judgments of particular 
determinants of work satisfaction has been 
observed in more recent studies. A RAND 
Corporation survey of over 3,000 American 
workers summarized its findings as follows:
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the American workplace is very physically 
and emotionally taxing, both for workers 
themselves and their families. Most 
Americans (two-thirds) frequently work 
at high speeds or under tight deadlines, 
and one in four perceives that they have 
too little time to do their job. More than 
one-half of Americans report exposure 
to unpleasant and potentially hazardous 
working conditions, and nearly one in five 
American workers are exposed to a hostile 
or threatening social environment at work 
(Maestas et al 2017). 
The same study reports that at least 
two-thirds of workers report “mismatch” 
between the working conditions they desire 
and the working conditions they have. Still, 
the respondents’ faith in work is intact, 
as four out of five respondents indicated 
that their work is meaningful in some way. 
A UK survey likewise found that half of 
British workers find their work meaningful 
(Dahlgreen/YouGov 2015).8 This same 
pattern — positive global appraisals of 
work alongside largely negative appraisals 
of the factors on which those global 
appraisals ought to be based — recurs in a 
Pew Research Group (2016b) study of US 
workers. Again, only a small fraction (15 
percent) report being at least somewhat 
dissatisfied with their jobs, and about half 
report that their jobs offer them a sense of 
identity. But underneath the surface, anxiety 
and dissatisfaction loom: A majority report 
that they do not receive the ongoing training 
or education needed to succeed in the job 
market, that desirable jobs are increasingly 
hard to find, and that their wages are not 
adequate to ensure themselves a decent 
retirement. Meanwhile, both hours worked 
per week and weeks worked per year have 
climbed over the past generation. In sum, 
“many Americans think jobs in the U.S. are 
less secure, more pressured, less rewarding 
in terms of benefits, and less built on worker 
loyalty to employers than in the past.” The 
vast majority expect such conditions to 
worsen over coming decades (Pew Research 
Center 2016a). Studies of European 
workers have reached similar conclusions 
(Eurofound, 2017).
A number of caveats are in order here. 
Societies and workplaces vary, and 
unsurprisingly, workers with higher 
levels of income, education, workplace 
autonomy, and job benefits view their work 
more positively, both globally and in the 
particular. Moreover, much of what workers 
find undesirable in their work is contingent, 
set by employer or government policies 
that, if reformed, might improve working 
conditions. 
 
Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that, on 
balance, today’s labourers seem to love 
work in principle or in the abstract but 
seem to find their actual work conditions 
disappointing, even  worthy of resentment. 
Their global judgments regarding work’s 
desirability are thus underdetermined by 
their judgments of the particular factors 
on which such global judgments are 
presumptively based. This, I suggest, is 
what we would anticipate if the desire to 
work were maintained by an aversion to 
alternatives such that those alternatives 
have become unthinkable thanks to the 
baleful influence of social conditioning 
under unjust conditions. Getting individuals 
to acknowledge that their living conditions 
could be inherently unjust works against 
the deep seated human tendency to view 
the world as just by nature (Furnham 2003). 
At the same time, workers’ attitudes toward 
the particular facets of their work suggest 
that they would not, upon full reflection, 
conclude that they work under just 
conditions. The most viable way to reduce 
this tension — to reduce the cognitive 
dissonance between work as it should be 
in a just society and work as it is in most 
actual societies — is for the desire to work 
to be psychologically and epistemically 
cordoned off from the evidence relevant to 
it. That is to say, it is necessary for many 
people to successfully desire work very 
8   Intriguingly though, 37% of British workers in that 
same survey said their jobs do not make any meaningful 
contribution to the world.
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much against the tide of evidence against its 
desirability under present day conditions. 
Only if the value of work has been elevated 
to a dogmatic ideology can it plausibly be 
immune to the abundant counterevidence 
offered by the contemporary workplace. 
4. Conclusion: Policymaking and the desire 
for work in a post-work future
We have seen, then, how the desire to 
work is an adaptive preference: a desire 
formed under, and in response to, unjust 
circumstances of work and labour wherein 
many in modern societies to view (a) work 
as indispensable, despite often viewing 
their own work as unsatisfactory, even 
meaningless, and (b) alternatives to work as 
essentially unthinkable. 
 
If I am correct and work is an adaptive 
preference, then as we approach the 
possibility of an increasingly ‘post-work’ 
future, policymakers ought not to be as 
fixated on satisfying individuals’ desires to 
work as they are now. To aim at satisfying 
this desire may not only be fruitless, it 
is also to satisfy a preference that is in a 
fundamental sense a preference for an 
unjust state of affairs, namely, one in which 
limiting one’s work efforts, or refraining 
from work altogether, is neither materially 
viable nor socially sanctioned.
 
An obvious rejoinder to this conclusion 
is ‘easier said than done.’ The emergence 
of post-work economies could result 
in widespread moral distress. As large 
numbers of individuals become incapable 
of accessing work, they are likely to be 
deprived of sources of meaning or identity 
and may feel guilt or resentment at their 
inability to fulfil their perceived obligation 
to materially contribute to the larger society 
through their work efforts. In democratic 
societies, only a very brave elected official is 




Policymakers facing a post-work future 
thus confront a difficult balancing act: 
having recognized that the desire to work 
is an adaptive preference, they should be 
hesitant to craft policies aimed at satisfying 
that desire (even assuming that they could 
manage to craft policies that can withstand 
the tide of trends making its satisfaction 
harder), while at the same time attending to 
the adverse psychological and eudaimonic 
consequences of the emergence of the post-
work society. Policymakers must engineer 
a soft landing, one in which individuals can 
‘un-adapt’ from the work-centered society 
and begin to adapt to a post-work society. As 
Serene Khader (2011, p. 42) observes, adaptive 
preferences, while often deeply entrenched, 
can be dislodged if individuals are exposed 
to alternative possibilities that foster their 
scrutiny of those preferences. A central pillar 
in preparing us for a post-work future will 
be to steadily acclimatise individuals to a 
society in which work is more peripheral. 
This can be achieved through an array of 
reforms including de-emphasizing vocational 
goals in the educational process; lowering 
retirement ages; reducing the length of the 
work week and/or work year; validating 
(rather than shaming) adolescents who 
engage in self-exploration and delay entry 
into the workforce; and detaching public 
welfare initiatives from conditions related to 
work or the seeking thereof. By dissociating 
work from social status, such reforms would 
expose the adaptive preference for work to 
greater scrutiny and invite individuals to take 
work reduction or refusal more seriously as 
Millian ‘experiments in living.’ Obviously, the 
reforms needed to mitigate the moral distress 
that would likely accompany the emergence 
of the post-work economy are profound. But 
the slow dislodging of entrenched attitudes 
regarding work is clearly preferable to ignoring 
the likely detrimental consequences that such 
attitudes will lead to should the predicted 
post-work world materialize.9
9    My thanks to my colleagues Alex Madva, Katie 
Gasdaglis, and Peter Ross, and to my students in my 
winter 2018 seminar “The Ethics and Politics of Work”, 
for feedback on earlier versions of this essay.
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